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The Dark Side of Derivatives: A Book Note on Infectious GreedHow Deceit and Risk Corruptedthe FinancialMarkets by Frank
Partnoy
By now, most everyone has heard of the Enron debacle,
but few understand what really happened. In Frank Partnoy's
latest book,1 Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corruptedthe
FinancialMarkets, the author compellingly recounts the characters
and events that led to the Enron drama.2 Partnoy chronicles the
development of complex over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and
the role they played in Enron's collapse.' He also examines the
legislative and regulatory backdrop that fostered the spread of
OTC derivatives while contributing to what he perceives as the
present instability of financial markets.4
Partnoy's fear of a global financial crisis stems from three
major changes in the financial markets over the past fifteen years.5
First, the proliferation of unregulated OTC derivatives permitted
parties "to manipulate earnings and exclude reporting of these
instruments on their financial statements." 6 Second, company
control and ownership became more polarized, as investors
struggled to monitor the financial activities of senior managers,
and accountability lapsed between senior managers and
"increasingly aggressive
employees."7 Third, deregulated
derivatives markets encouraged parties utilizing these instruments
to engage in financial malfeasance without fear of prosecution. 8
This book Note highlights the greed-induced schemes,
scandals, and blunders surrounding corporate corruption and the
1. Frank Partnoy also authored, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL
STREET (1997).
2. See generally FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003) [hereinafter PARTNOY].
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See id.
See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 3.
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use of derivatives as described by Partnoy in Infectious Greed.9
Part I provides a brief overview of OTC derivative instruments
and their uses.' ° Part II examines the competitive banking
environments that spawned the OTC derivatives explosion. 1" Part
III reviews the early warnings of the devastating impact OTC
derivatives would have on financial markets. 2 Part IV explores
other market forces that coincided with the proliferation of OTC
derivatives and served as a backdrop for the Enron implosion. 3
Part V reveals the secret world of Enron and the role OTC
derivatives played in its demise. 4 Part VI considers Partnoy's
recommendations for improved OTC derivatives regulation and
offers insight into the continued role of derivatives in the financial
markets. 5
I. DERIVATIVES OVERVIEW

"A derivative is a bilateral contract or payment exchange
agreement whose value is linked to, or derived from, an underlying
asset.' 6 The underlying asset, often referred to simply as the
"underlying," can be virtually anything, including "cash
instruments, like stocks and bonds; tangibles, like commodities; or
intangibles, like interest rates, currency rates, stock market indices,
and credit quality."" Due to their highly leveraged structure, small
changes in the value of the underlying can result in wild
fluctuations in the value of the derivative on which it is based. 8
Derivatives reallocate risk by isolating certain risks associated with
a particular underlying and transferring that risk from one party to

9. See generally PARTNOY, supra note 2.
10. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 43-124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 125-154 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-179 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 180-250 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 251-281 and accompanying text.
16. Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New FinancialBingo": A Risk-Based
Approach to Understanding Derivatives,23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997).
17. Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The- Counter Derivatives,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 681 (2002).
18. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 7.
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do not eliminate underlying
the other. 9 "Importantly, derivatives
20
risk; they only reposition it."
Derivatives can be traded on exchanges or over-thecounter. 2' Exchange-traded derivatives include standardized stock
options and commodity futures, which are regulated and actively
traded, providing liquidity and price transparency.22 In contrast,
OTC derivatives are traded off exchanges by brokers and dealers
and are generally unregulated, off-balance sheet investments.23
OTC derivatives are customized risk management instruments
designed for the specific needs of a particular investor. 24 The
primary types of OTC derivatives include forward-based
derivatives, such as forward contracts and swaps, and options25
based derivatives.
Every derivative, no matter how complex, is modeled on
the basic structure of either the forward or the option.26
Essentially, a forward is an obligation to buy or sell something in
the future, while an option is the right, but not the obligation, to
buy or sell something in the future.
Forward-based derivatives include forward contracts,
futures contracts, and swap transactions.28 In a forward contract,
one party buys and the other party sells "a designated quantity of
the underlying at a pre-agreed price on some specified future
date. ,29 The gain to one counterparty in a forward-based
transaction always equals the loss to the other party, i.e., it is a
zero sum transaction.3" A futures contract is a standardized,
exchange-traded, forward-based derivative. 3 A swap transaction is
a series of forward contracts, which obligates the two contracting
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Feder, supra note 17, at
Id. at 683.
See Krawiec, supra note 16,
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 9.
See Feder, supra note 17, at
See Krawiec, supra note 16,
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.

682.
at 6.

691.
at 9.
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parties to exchange payment streams based on a notional
amount.32 In a typical interest rate swap, one swap party is
obligated to make fixed rate payments, while the counterparty is
obligated to make floating rate payments.33 At settlement, one
party pays the other party the net difference of the two payment
streams.34
An option contract gives the holder the right to buy or sell
a specified underlying asset at a pre-agreed price (strike price) up
to a specified future date.35 Favorable price movements in the
underlying asset benefit the option holder upon exercise of the
option, while unfavorable price movements result in a loss limited
to the premium paid for the unexercised option.36 Options are used
primarily for hedging market risk or for speculation, as a
leveraging device.37
Financial institutions and corporations are the primary
players in the OTC derivatives markets, acting as both dealers and
end-users. 38 Derivatives dealers are intermediaries who take sides
in transactions and earn spreads after contracting with parties to
take the opposite sides of the transactions. 39 End-users of
derivatives are the final buyers and sellers of risk.4" End-users are
motivated to consume derivatives products for hedging,
speculating and/or arbitraging purposes.41 The customized nature
of OTC derivatives allows hedgers, speculators, and arbitrageurs
almost limitless means by which to accomplish their investment
strategies, accounting in great part for the dramatic rise in demand
for these products.42

32. Id. The notional amount serves as a computational factor and is generally not
exchanged on settlement, with the exception of currency swaps. Id.
33. Feder, supra note 17, at 702.
34. Krawiec, supra note 16, at 10. Swaps and forward contracts, unlike futures
contracts, are individually negotiated and traded over-the-counter. Id.
35. See id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Feder, supra note 17, at 717.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See generally Krawiec, supra note 16.
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II. THE INNOVATORS
A.

Salomon Brothers

Salomon Brothers, Bankers Trust, and Credit Suisse First
Boston (CS First Boston) emerged as derivatives innovators in the
mid 1980s and early 1990s. 4 3 Leaders within each institution
understood the significant role that specialized derivatives could
These
play in the stock market's 1987 post-crash recovery.'
pioneering firms recognized the increasing importance of
technology in the securities industry and the critical training that
math, physics, and economics graduates could bring to the field of
financial engineering.45
From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, Jon
Meriwether4 6 headed the Arbitrage Group at Salomon Brothers.47
During the 1980s, the Arbitrage Group focused on complex
arbitrage48 and mortgage instruments, which generated vast sums
for Salomon.4 9 In 1984, Meriwether realized that advanced
technology in options pricing might give the Arbitrage Group a
sustainable edge over its competitors. ° In response, Meriwether
and his talented troupe5 designed the first options pricing systems
using a high-speed network of personal computers.52
43. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 36-111.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 84. Meriwether attended the University of Chicago and was greatly
influenced by economist Merton Miller, a proponent of the efficient-market theory.
Id. at 87. Miller believed that financial innovation was driven by regulatory
avoidance. Id.
47. Id. at 84. Meriwether joined Salomon Brothers in 1973 and in 1977
established the Arbitrage Group. Id. It was comprised of brilliant scholars known as
the best finance faculty in the world. Id. at 91.
48. Id. at 84. Arbitrage, essentially buying a market instrument at a low price
while simultaneously selling it at a high price, is made possible by market mispricings
due to information inefficiencies. Id. at 39.
49. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 86.
50. Id. at 90. The most important pricing variable for currency options is
volatility, or the degree to which the value of the underlying currency moves up or
down. Id. at 12. Since greater volatility means greater risk, the option will be priced
higher. Id.
51. Id. at 13. One Arbitrage Group member, Andrew Krieger, brought critical
expertise to Salomon's pricing superiority. Id. Krieger studied finance at the
Wharton School of Business, and found himself captivated by foreign-currency
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The technological advances, albeit crude, created new
opportunities, and spurrred Arbitrage Group members to develop
increasingly complex products for clients who demanded
customized derivatives to meet their risk and profitability needs. 3
In 1992, Salomon made hundreds of millions of dollars on these
customized derivatives transactions,54 and rewarded the Arbitrage
Group traders who invented them with bonuses ranging from $10
million to $25 million a piece.55
The Arbitrage Group received unfettered autonomy from
Salomon's management, which proved crucial to the group's
success because it allowed members to ride out their bets when
other firms' traders were forced to liquidate their positions by
unnerved managers. 56 The lax management control at Salomon,
however, encouraged traders to place wild bets while skirting legal

options trading, the right to buy or sell foreign currencies at specified times and
prices in the future, after taking a course in international finance. Id. While at
Wharton, Krieger wrote a computer program assessing the value of currency options.
Id. Additionally, he worked at a Chicago currency-trading firm and learned about
currency trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Id. The Chicago Mercantile
Exchange introduced currency options in 1982 when few investment bankers knew
about them or the theory of options pricing. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 91. Meriwether set up trading desks in London and Tokyo using similar
computers systems, exploiting options opportunities in international markets as well.
Id.
53. Id. at 92. One such strategy devised by an Arbitrage Group member involved
Japanese convertible bonds. Id.'at 91. A convertible bond is made up of two
components: a bond and an option to buy stock. Id. The value of the bond
component rises as the issuer's stock price declines and vice versa. Id. Since the
Japanese market significantly undervalued convertible bonds, Salomon bought them
and split them into two pieces, one piece representing the bond, and the other piece
representing the stock option. Id. at 91. The pieces were hedged using interest-rate
swaps and stock options and were sold off separately for more money than it paid for
the whole. Id. The Arbitrage Group traders created two products from each bond
that sold for far more than the price of the original bond. Id. at 92.
54. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 103. Salomon also pioneered the complex
mortgage derivative, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). Id. With CMOs,
Salomon purchased mortgages and stripped them into pieces, based on various
criteria, including interest rates, principal, short-term, long-term, etc. Id. Salomon
made money from mortgages in three ways. First, it received creative fees for setting
up the deals. Id. Second, it earned commissions from selling the instruments at
substantial premiums (mostly because investors did not understand how to valuate
them). Id. Third, Salomon made money from trading CMOs in its own accounts. Id.
55. Id. at 91-92. Salomon's Arbitrage Group traders were the highest paid on
Wall Street at the time. Id. at 84.
56. Id. at 95.
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rules, which ultimately led to the ouster of Salomon's top
management, including Meriwether"
In the early 1990s, despite all of its technological
innovation, Salomon was not able to reliably value its own
derivatives positions.58 In 1993, Salomon overhauled the firm's
internal risk management system 59 and discovered millions of
dollars of mistakes, $87 million worth in the U.S. and $194 million
in London.6" Neither Salomon, nor its accountants at Arthur
Anderson, could understand or accurately value the risks of
Salomon's complex derivatives.6"
B.

Bankers Trust

In 1983, Bankers Trust appointed Charles S. Sanford, Jr.
president.62 Wanting Bankers Trust to be more than a staid
commercial bank, Sanford strived to make it a leading derivatives
participant and the most technologically advanced bank in the
world. 63 To accomplish this transformation, Sanford focused on
financial technology, incentives for employees and deregulation.'
Sanford hired traders and sales people with science and math
backgrounds. 65 These "chess masters and physics Ph.D.s" created
investment devices that enabled Bankers Trust's clients to
generate profits by repositioning risks while avoiding regulation.66
57. Id. at 98-107. Meriwether and other Salomon executives were forced to
resign in 1991 after a Treasury bond trader repeatedly engaged in practices to
manipulate the U.S. Treasury Bond market. Id. at 98.
58. Id. at 94.
59. Id.
60. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 94. Because of an outdated accounting system,
the debts had been mounting undetected since 1989. Id.
61. Id. at 95.
62. Id. at 15. Sanford started his career at Bankers Trust in 1961 after graduating
from Wharton. Id. at 37. He headed the bank's bond-trading operations and
persuaded bosses to pay performance-based bonuses for his traders, mimicking Wall
Street firms. Id.
63. Id. at 37.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 38. A former managing director of Bankers
Trust described Sanford's recruits "as really nice kids, mostly nerds, mostly guys
without girlfriends [who] would hang out in the office and work all night." Id.
Another remarked it was a "technoloony bin of crazed nerds." Id.
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Taking cues from Wall Street investment banks, Sanford applied
intense pressure on employees to meet performance goals, even
implementing a profitability measure that tied compensation for
all bank employees to the return they generated on the capital at
their disposal. 67 Bankers Trust's sophisticated risk-management
systems, intellectual horsepower, and competitive bonus
environment positioned it on the forefront of the derivatives
explosion.68
In 1987, Bankers Trust appointed Sanford chairman and
CEO. 69 Shortly thereafter, he hired Andy Krieger, 7° a former top
Salomon trader, to start up a currency-options trading business.71
Sanford gave twenty-nine-year-old Krieger $700 million of trading
capital, allowing him to control billions of dollars worth of
currency.72 Krieger made enormous profits for Bankers Trust by
exploiting mispricings in the currency markets. 73 To achieve this,
Krieger, an options-pricing visionary,74 utilized sophisticated
pricing models, while other traders relied on flawed models that
tended to undervalue foreign currency options. 75 Krieger preferred
OTC derivatives trading because he could use options to hide his
trading strategies.76 Additionally, his use of options over actual
67. Id. at 43. The system, Risk Adjusted Capital Return (RAROC), determined
the allocation of the bank's capital. Id. The greater the capital risk, the lower the
RAROC, so performance would have to be higher. Id. RAROC was a revolutionary
concept that encouraged employees to focus on both risks and profits. Id. The
RAROC compensation concept quickly spread throughout corporate America. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id.
71. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 15. Krieger had generated $56 million in
option-currency profits for Salomon, but he was dissatisfied with his bonus relative to
other group members. Id. at 17. Krieger's bonus-envy made him ripe for defection
when Bankers Trust came wooing with a more lucrative bonus offer. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id. at 14. Although markets were supposed to be efficient and reflect all
known information, Krieger and many other Wall Street traders found the efficient
markets economic theory flawed. Id.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 15.
76. Id. at 19. In a typical trade, if Krieger wanted to sell one billion British
pounds, he would enter a buy order below market price and wait for greedy traders
to rush in to buy, trying to cut him off. Id. at 17. After the traders had driven the
price up, Krieger would sell the pounds, instead of buying, and profit from the run up
in price. Id. In one application of this strategy, Krieger sold $1 billion in German
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currencies allowed him to leverage his capital, further magnifying
his profits (and risk).77 When Krieger left Bankers Trust in 1988,"8

his currency-option trading group had generated more than $300
million in profits for the bank that year.79
Prior to Krieger's arrival, Bankers Trust's derivatives
business, like most other commercial banks, had focused mainly on
interbank interest-rate hedges known as plain-vanilla swaps.8 ° A
plain-vanilla swap agreement is essentially a bilateral contract
enabling two parties to hedge or speculate on interest rate
fluctuations by exchanging interest-rate based payment streams at
periodic payment or settlement dates based on a notional
amount.8' With $30 billion in swap revenue, Bankers Trust was
82
the second leading swap dealer at the time.
In 1988, after continued innovation, Bankers Trust
developed an OTC stock-index product that enabled Japanese
insurance companies, who were proscribed from investing in
stocks, to invest in the Nikkei 225 index.83 Bankers Trust called
marks and marks options, betting the U.S. dollar would rise. Id. at 25. He made $70
million dollars on the trade. Id.
77. Id. at 15.
78. Id. at 26. Krieger left Bankers Trust because they only paid him a $3 million
bonus instead of $15 million he had been promised. Id. at 26.
79. Id. at 29. After Krieger's departure, Bankers Trust learned that Krieger's
profits had been overvalued by $80 million, prompting the bank to manipulate its
accounting numbers to avoid posting its first loss in almost 60 years. Id. Despite
detection by banking regulators, Bankers Trust, and its accountants, Arthur Young,
avoided punishment for the illegal expense reporting. Id. at 31-32.
80. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 4.
81. Krawiec, supra note 16, at 10. The notional amount is the number of units of
the underlying asset to which the contract applies and is usually used only as a
computational factor upon which calculations are based. See Feder, supra note 17, at
683-84; see PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 4. Partnoy describes these interbank interestrate swaps as transactions where one party agrees to a fixed rate of interest to
another party, and the other party in return agrees to pay a floating rate. Id. These
fairly simple derivatives are similar to financial instruments used by the ancient
Greeks. Id.
82. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 38. Citicorp was the number one swaps trader.
Id. Banks and corporate clients viewed swaps as a desirable investment device
because FASB did not treat swaps as an asset or liability, so they did not appear on
corporate balance sheets. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 40. Through a complex mechanism that involved Canadian and
European banks, as well as the Japanese insurers, the Japanese insurance companies
ended up owning Nikkei index options and Bankers Trust wound up making
substantial fees. Id. at 41. Of course, the Japanese insurers were devastated when
the Nikkei 225 crashed later that year. Id.
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this and other matchmaking strategies "equity derivatives."" By
1989, one third of the Bank's profits came from these
instruments.85
A further boon to Bankers Trust's business came in 1989
when the Federal Reserve permitted certain commercial banks,
including Bankers Trust, to form investment-banking subsidiaries
to engage in the sale of securities.86 Bankers Trust capitalized on
this regulatory change by selling significant quantities of derivative
instruments at substantial premiums to corporate treasurers
looking for ways to hide investment risks from shareholders and
corporate bosses.87

From 1990 to 1993, Bankers Trust was the most profitable
bank in the U.S. 88 During this time, Bankers Trust generated one
third of its profits from derivatives, and another third from
trading. 89 These impressive figures were largely due to the
mercenary culture that Sanford encouraged at Bankers Trust,
where senior managers applauded aggressive salesmen who lured
clients into lucrative, complex swap deals that neither the clients
nor the salesmen really understood.9 °
84. Id. at 41.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 47; Sec. Indus. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47, 51 (1988) (holding that section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit
bank holding company subsidiaries from dealing in bank-ineligible securities as long
as the subsidiaries were not "engaged principally" in such activities, that is, as long as
they derive no more than five to ten percent of their total gross revenues from such
activities over a two-year period). In 1999, Congress repealed section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1999), with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Financial
Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, which permitted
financial holding companies to engage in unlimited securities activities.
87. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 49. Customized derivatives deals with Gibson
Greetings and Proctor & Gamble proved extremely lucrative and suspect for Bankers
Trust. Id.; see infra note 90.
88. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 60.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 54-58. Bankers Trust entered into several customized deals with
Gibson Greetings and Proctor & Gamble. Id. at 50-58. The deals were ridiculously
complex, including one deal which tied the swap payments to the interest rate
squared that was in turn tied to LIBOR. Id. at 51. Gibson sustained losses of nearly
one million dollars on the transaction. Id. at 52. Bankers Trust encouraged Gibson
to enter into twenty-nine additional derivatives deals in which it placed huge interest
rate bets. Id. at 50. Bankers Trust made roughly $18 million in fees from Gibson
swap business. Id. at 53. Bankers Trust made $8 million on just one of many
customized derivative trades for Proctor & Gamble. Id. at 54. Both Gibson
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CS First Boston

CS First Boston entered the derivatives scene in 1990, after
Credit Suisse, a huge Swiss commercial bank, rushed in to save91
First Boston, an investment bank, from almost certain death.
Credit Suisse was hoping to gain a presence in the derivatives
market, and conveniently, First Boston had recently hired away a
dozen star Bankers Trust traders.92 The new traders quickly
formed CS Financial Products (CSFP), a joint venture between the
Swiss commercial bank and First Boston. 93 CSFP, located in
London, handled all of the swaps and derivatives activities for both
firms, thus avoiding U.S. banking laws. 94
Credit Suisse's AAA credit rating gave CSFP a significant
advantage over its competition when creating derivative
products. 9 Credit ratings from the three recognized credit rating
agencies were hugely important to investing because regulators
had passed dozens of laws that depended on credit ratings. 96
Effectively, the higher the credit rating assigned by the allpowerful credit rating agencies, the better the regulatory
treatment.97 In addition, high credit ratings were important to
banks because many of their regulated clients were prohibited
from investing in sub-investment grade instruments." Moreover,

Greetings and Proctor & Gamble went on to sue Bankers Trust for fraud relating to
the swap deals. Id. at 416-17.
91. Id. at 62. Credit Suisse bought a 45 percent stake in First Boston, the most
permitted under Glass-Steagall. Id. at 62.
92. Id. at 63. Allen Wheat was among the Bankers Trust traders hired by First
Boston. Id. at 62, 64. Wheat had worked at Bankers Trust for nine years and had
expertise in swaps, options and private placements, and Asian bank operations. Id.
Wheat became president and COO of CS First Boston in 1993. Id. at 81.
93. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 64.
94. See id.
95. Id. Most Wall Street investment banks had only single-A credit ratings. Id.
96. Id. at 66. The three approved credit rating agencies, Moody's, Standard &
Poors, and Fitch Investors, had been in existence since the early 1900's, but they
gained importance in the 1970's when regulators began tying legal rules to ratings.
Id. The credit rating of derivative instruments became an enormously lucrative
business for the three agencies that were approved for regulatory purposes. Id.
97. Id. Credit ratings range from AAA (highest) to D (lowest) with BBB
signaling the investment-grade cut-off. Id.
98. Id. The higher the credit rating for an investment instrument, the greater the
demand for that instrument. See id.
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high credit ratings meant lower costs of capital for investment
banks and corporations, and insurance companies maintained
lower reserves for higher rated bonds in their portfolios.99

In the early 1990s, two major innovations accounted for
CSFP's enormous success in the derivatives business."' ° One was
structured notes, which were essentially high rated bonds whose

payments were linked to complex formulas.' 1 The other was
structured finance, which referred to deals in which financial assets
were stripped apart and repackaged to obtain higher ratings.0 2
A structured note, unlike a typical bond, might have
dramatically variable returns with payouts based on any
conceivable financial instrument, but usually tied to interest rates
or currencies. 0 3 CSFP created structured notes based on Asian
currencies -

Thailand specifically -

which allowed U.S. investors

access to a forbidden market."° Investors coveted structured notes
for their favorable regulatory treatment that allowed for offbalance sheet reporting.' 5 The difficulties associated with pricing
the underlying assets on which the structured notes were based
enabled CSFP to charge unwitting investors exorbitant premiums
for these and many other derivatives investments. 106 "By the end
of 1993, every major bank sold structured notes."'0 7
Structured finance involves "the repackaging of financial
assets in order to reallocate risks and obtain higher credit
99. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 66.
100. Id. at 67-68. In 1990, CSFP earned "Options House of the Year" and "Best
Derivatives House." Id. at 67.
101. Id. at 67-68.
102. Id. at 68.
103. Id. "One structured note payout was even linked to the number of victories
of the Utah Jazz." Id.
104. Id. at 68-69. One of CSFP's most successful products was the Quanto, a
"turbocharged version" of a structured note in which investors received payments
based on foreign exchange rates, yet the payments were made in the investor's home
currency. Id. at 73-74. The payoffs depended on the correlation of interest rates and
currencies. Id. The complexity of Quantos made them difficult for investment banks
to accurately price, so investors unwittingly overpaid for them. Id. The allure of
Quantos was "they allowed investors who, by law, were not permitted to speculate in
a particular currency to do so indirectly without detection." Id. at 74. U.S. insurance
companies were heavy consumers of Quantos. Id.
105. See PARTNOY, supra note 2. at 72.
106. See id., at 72-74.
107. Id. at 70.
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ratings."1°8 One of the most notable means of structured finance is
the Collateralized Bond Obligation (CBO).

°9

In a CBO, a bank

transfers a portfolio of junk bonds to a Special Purpose Entity
(SPE) created for the transaction." ° The SPE then issues several
securities represented and backed by the bonds it received from
the bank transfer."' These issued securities are derived from
essentially splitting the underlying bonds into pieces and then

batching similar pieces together with credit ratings assigned based
on the quality of the batch." 2 Usually three pieces, or tranches,

result, including a senior piece, a mezzanine piece, and a low
quality sub-investment grade piece." 3
The two top pieces
generally receive investment grade ratings and are easy to sell."'
Thus, the CBO produces two highly marketable products from
one, making the sum of the pieces worth more than the whole.'
CSFP's senior pieces generally had higher yields than
comparably rated investments, thus fund managers who were
restricted to buying investment-grade instruments could generate
higher returns with senior tranches than they could almost any
other way." 6 CBOs were especially attractive to banks because
they did not have to maintain bank reserves for the repackaged
highly rated pieces." 7 Additionally, a typical CBO deal generated

108. Id. at 76. For example, some banks sold shares in trusts "backed by customer
credit-card payments." Id. at 77. Unlike bonds that were backed by the issuer of the
bond, the trusts were backed only by the assets of the trust. Id. Trusts typically
received higher credit ratings, making them more appealing and enabling
institutional investors to buy them. Id.
109. Id. at 77.
110. Id. at 78-81. An SPE is typically a newly created company, partnership or
other entity formed specifically for a particular transaction in which an independent
outside investor represents at least 50 percent ownership of the SPE, providing at
least 3 percent equity. Id.
111. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 78.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 79. See Steven L. Schwartz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) (explaining the mechanics of asset securitization).
See also STEVEN L. SCHWARTZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002); JASON H. P. KRAViTF, SECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS (2d ed. 1997).
116. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 78.
117. Id. at 79.
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fees of several million dollars." 8 In 1994, CSFP produced $240
million in profits, while CS First Boston made just $155 million. " 9
CSFP's clients valued its derivatives products because they
enabled them to make risk reallocations (or2 "place bets") they
otherwise would not have been able to make. 1
In order to compete with First Boston's higher credit
ratings, many investment banks set up SPE subsidiaries1 2 1 since a
subsidiary could earn a much higher credit rating than the
investment bank parent, typically AAA, if the subsidiary adhered
to strict limitations.12 2 Furthermore, these partnerships were
hidden from view, and enjoyed non-disclosure on financial
statements. 23 Within a24decade, structured finance exploded into a
trillion dollar industry.
III.

EARLY WARNINGS IGNORED

In 1994, the Federal Reserve unexpectedly raised the25
overnight interest rate, throwing financial markets into chaos.
Because many derivatives are, at their core, bets on interest rates,
the rate increase exposed how pervasive the use of derivative
instruments had become in the U.S. financial markets. 26 For
example, Orange County, California, one of the largest investors
in the country with a portfolio value of $7.4 billion, lost $1.7 billion
dollars of taxpayers' money primarily due to investments in
derivatives instruments. 2 7 Additionally, several banks were forced
118. Id. at 80. Because the credit rating agencies rated each individual piece, the
agencies made bundles on them too. Id. at 79.
119. Id. at 82.
120. Id. at 83.
121. Id. at 70.
122. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 70.
123. Id. at 80. FASB allowed that as long as an outside investor made a
substantial (at least three percent) investment and controlled the SPE, then the other
assets and liabilities of the SPE did not have to be disclosed on financial statements.
Id.
124. Id. at 68.
125. Id. at 112. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan raised overnight
interest rates from 3 to 3.25 percent. Id. at 112.
126. See id. at 112.
127. See id at 115-16. Orange County treasurer Robert Citron used structured
notes, betting billions of dollars on interest rates. Id. at 116-17. Merrill Lynch was
also a culpable party in the Orange County disaster when as underwriter of Orange
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to infuse cash to "prop up" money market funds they managed to
avoid losses, 28 while hedge-fund'29 managers, securities firms, and
banks, including Bankers Trust and Salomon, suffered terribly
from the rate hike. 30 Losses for the life insurance industry totaled
approximately $50 billion in bonds while property and casualty
insurers lost $20 billion.' 3' In 1995, the SEC "compiled a list of
institutions that lost money through various derivative instruments
during the previous year."1 32 The list revealed that derivatives had
infiltrated every kind of institution from every economic
33
segment.
Later in 1994, the collapse of the Mexican peso further
exposed the vulnerability that derivative instruments created in
13 6
global markets.134 The peso crisis"' caused huge losses in Europe
and Japan. 37 However, the biggest losers of all after the Mexican
crisis were U.S. mutual funds with heavily peso-denominated
County bonds, it failed to disclose or warn bond purchasers that it had also sold risky
interest rate derivatives to Orange County, arguably a violation of securities laws. Id.
at 118. The credit rating agencies shared blame as well because they had given
Orange County bonds AAA investment ratings even though the credit rating
agencies knew, because they had rated them and charged substantial fees, that
Orange County was holding derivatives in its portfolio. Id. at 118-19.
128. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 131. BankAmerica infused $68 million; First
Boston $40 million; Merrill Lynch $20 million; and Paine Webber $268 million. Id.
129. Id. at 135. Hedge fund is a generic term that refers to any unregulated
investment fund provided it has fewer than one hundred investors. Id.
130. Id. Bankers Trust reported its first loss since the 1930s while Salomon
reported a pre-tax loss of $371 million. Id.
131. Id. at 135. The losses were not disclosed on the insurers' financial statements
because they recorded bonds at historical cost. Id.
132. Id. at 136.
133. See id. at 137. George Soros, a successful investment fund manager, cautioned
that "many fund managers were using financial alchemy to make otherwiseprohibited bets" and that 'some of them [were] so esoteric that the risks involved
may not be properly understood by even the most sophisticated investors."' Id. at
114.
134. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 228.
135. Id. at 238. In 1995, President Clinton bailed out the Mexican government by
tapping into an obscure Exchange Stabilization Fund and providing $20 million of
structured swap loans, thereby averting the Mexican government from defaulting on
its debt, much of which was held by U.S. investors. Id. at 239. Mexico repaid the
loan in 1997, three years ahead of schedule. Id.
136. Id. at 232. Major European banks lost millions of dollars and faced lawsuits
over structured notes and mortgage derivatives sales to its customers. Id. For
example, Glaxo Holdings, Inc. lost more than $100 million on complex derivatives,
including structured notes and CMOs. Id. at 232.
137. Id.
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structured notes and options. 38 In 1995, Barings, a 233 year-old
British Bank, collapsed after a rogue derivatives trader lost more
than one billion dollars trading Nikkei 225 futures contracts.1 39 In
1998, the financial markets in Russia and Brazil faltered, leading to
an international crisis during which these markets briefly froze
before spiraling downward together.14° Financial engineering and
derivative instruments played a central role in all of these
international crises, "both contribut[ing] to the problems and
exacerbat[ing] the effects." 14 '
The Russian and Brazilian crises eventually destroyed
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), one of the most
respected hedge funds in the U.S. at the time.'42 Following the
crisis, LTCM lost nearly all of its investors' money in a matter of
weeks, while holding more than one trillion dollars of
derivatives. 43 Derivatives had tightened the connections among
international markets, creating enormous financial benefits and
making global transactions more cost effective.'" Alarmingly,
4
they also heightened the possibility of total systemic breakdown. 1
138. Id. at 237. Structured notes are debt issued by a highly rated company where
payments are linked to financial variables, such as the value of foreign currency. Id.
During the summer of 1994, U.S., European and Japanese investors made substantial
investments in Mexico where the peso was undervalued, thus creating a lucrative
currency differential opportunity. Id. at 234-36. As additional security on these
currency bets, investors relied on the Mexican central bank maintaining a currency
band that kept the peso value stable within an established range. Id. However, as
inflation surged the Mexican central bank was forced to abandon the currency band
and the value of the peso crashed. Id.
139. Id. at 228. Nikkei 225 futures are financial instruments based on the value of
the Japanese stock market index. Id. The Japanese stock market crashed in 1995
when a serious earthquake hit near Kobe, Japan. Id. at 242.
140. See PARTNOY, supra note 2 at 228.
141. Id.
142. Id. Jon Meriwether had started LTCM in 1993, two years after having been
forced to resign from Salomon Brothers. Id. at 251. LTCM employed some of the
top minds in the world of finance, including Robert C. Merton and Myron Scholes,
two of Meriwether's former finance professors, who would go on to win the 1997
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their work in options theory. Id. at 252.
143. Id. at 228.
144. Id. at 229.
145. Id.; see Krawiec, supra note 16, at 47. Systemic risk is the risk that "a
disturbance" in one market "will impair the efficient functioning of the financial
system and, at the extreme, cause its complete breakdown." Id. "Systemic risk arises
from the danger that the collapse of a single large dealer or end-user could spread in
a domino effect, causing serious repercussions for the entire global financial system."
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After the interest-rate market upheaval, the two most
influential leaders managing the regulatory response were SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., and Mark C. Brickell, a powerful
Washington lobbyist for the International Swap Dealers
Association (ISDA).

14 6

Both men opposed regulation of the

147

derivatives industry.
Levitt argued that regulation was
148
premature and that derivatives were valuable hedging devices.
Brickell echoed Levitt, warning Congress that new legislation
could cause "unforeseen damage," and that "regulators could not
possibly understand or control the situation any better than
market participants."' 49 A persuaded Congress enacted no
derivatives legislation following the 1994 interest rate crisis,
choosing instead to continue allowing the industry to police
itself. 15 0
Congress did, however, pass the Private Securities
Litigation and Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),'' further insulating
Wall Street from liability and enabling financial firms to selfregulate.5 2 PLSRA aided deregulation of the financial markets
because it made securities fraud cases more difficult for plaintiffs
to mount by preventing accounting firms, investment banks, and
146. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 141. ISDA had been successful since 1985 in
persuading Congress to allow derivatives to remain unregulated and financial
markets to go unchecked. Id. Not surprisingly, ISDA members were major political
donors. Id.
147. Id. at 153.
148. Id. at 150. Levitt did issue an advisory to fund managers telling them to sell
certain kinds of structured notes. Id.
149. Id at 141-42.
150. Id. at 142-43. As early as 1992, at least one member of Congress, Iowa
Representative Jim Leach, a non-PAC recipient, had concerns and doggedly pursued
the derivative regulation cause. Id. at 147-48. As the leading Republican on the
House Banking Committee, he produced a 900-page report on the state of derivatives
and described the markets as "a house of cards." Id. In May 1994, the General
Accounting Office found many serious problems related to derivatives, including
regulatory gaps, antiquated accounting practices, and uncontrolled risk-management.
Id. at 150. The GAO suggested a sweeping overhaul of derivatives regulation,
including "federal regulation of the safety and soundness of all OTC-derivatives
dealers." Id. Levitt opposed the GAO recommendations, as did most federal
regulators, and the reforms were not implemented. Id.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
152. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 173. Congressional legislation followed the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue accounting firms,
investment banks, or law firms for aiding and abetting). Id. at 172.
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law firms from being held liable for aiding and abetting in financial
The complexity of financial malfeasance cases
fraud cases.'
coupled with PLSRA sent the message to the marketplace that
there was only a remote possibility of going to jail for financial
misdealings.'54
IV. THE ENRON BACKDROP

In addition to the propagation of complex derivatives in the
global financial markets, other legislative and stock market
developments in the mid-to-late 1990s strongly influenced the
One
financial machinations that Enron would later employ.'
significant legislative development was a Clinton-backed tax law
change that limited the corporate tax deduction for executive
salaries to $1 million.'56 Despite its laudable intent to curb
excessive CEO salaries, the bill contained a loophole exempting
"performance-based compensation" from the $1 million dollar
' The exemption loophole prompted corporations to shift
cap. "57
executive compensation from salaries to stock options, a type of
performance-based compensation, thus saving companies from
expensing the option compensation,'58 and even more important,
conveniently keeping the stock options off corporate books. 5 9
The insidious effect of this accounting change was that CEOs
shifted their focus from maximizing long-term profitability to

153. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 173. PLSRA placed other hurdles in front of
plaintiffs in securities fraud cases, including: 1) decreasing the statute of limitations
period for filing suits; 2) restricting legal fees paid to plaintiffs; 3) eliminating punitive
damages provisions from securities lawsuits; 4) requiring a higher burden for
plaintiffs to show reckless intent; and 5) exempting "forward looking statements"
from liability. Id. One money manager later testified before the House Energy
Committee that PSLRA was responsible for many of the financial abuses that
occurred between 1995 and 2002. Id. at 173.
154. Id. at 168-69.
155. See id. at 216.
156. Id. at 156. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 amended section
(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13, 211 (1993). Id. at 425,
n.46.
157. Id. at 156.
158. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 157. Since 1972, FASB accounting rules have
treated stock options as a non-expense item. Id.
159. See id. at 156.

2004]

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND DERIVATIVES

307

obsessing over quarterly earnings expectations. 6 '
Corporate executives easily adapted to "massaging"
company accounting numbers 16' in order to meet quarterly
projections, which in turn increased their personal wealth as the
value of their stock options climbed in step with corporate stock
prices. 16
Together, the tax change and PLSRA provided
opportunities for various gatekeepers including CEOs,
accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers - to exploit
conflicts of interest with impunity.'63 Ultimately, the performancebased, profits-at-any-cost mindset that developed among many
corporate executives spread throughout the securities industry,"6
afflicting investment bankers, securities analysts, accountants, and
65
corporate boards.
Many new individual investors were oblivious to the
breakdown in gatekeeper controls that was occurring during the
mid 1990s stock market expansion. 66 Daytrading 67 and CNBC's
160. See id. at 157.
161. Id. at 187. During the 1990s and into 2000, CEOs at CUC International (now
Cendant), Waste Management, Sunbeam, and Rite Aid were indicted or forced to
resign for accounting improprieties at their respective companies. Id. at 195, 198,
203,206. The accountants for each of these companies, all Big-Five accounting firms,
aided the CEOs in their financial manipulation schemes by knowingly signing-off on
the financial statements. Id. at 194, 197, 203, 205. Arthur Andersen served as
accountants for Sunbeam and Waste Management, Ernst & Young worked for CUC
and KPMG serviced Rite Aid. Id. In 2001, Anderson paid over $100 million to settle
these securities fraud suits. Id. at 203. Moreover, in a 1998 survey of chief financial
officers of major Wall Street corporations, 12 percent admitted they had
misrepresented corporate financial results and 55 percent said they had been asked to
misrepresent results. Id. at 206.
162. Id. at 287. To further manipulate the market for their stocks, the corporate
executives "selectively disclosed" key information to their favorite analysts without
general public disclosures, and then they prepared analysts in advance of public
announcements so that analysts could adjust their recommendations accordingly. Id.
163. See id. at 187.
164. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 157. Investment bankers who underwrote new
IPO stock issues, securities analysts whose job it was to assess the value and risk of
the companies on which they reported, accountants who were to audit corporate
books for compliance with accepted accounting practices and corporate directors
who were to monitor managements' activitie3 on behalf of shareholders were
included in those who became susceptible to lax oversight or outright deception. Id.
at 187-88.
165. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
166. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 207.
167. Id. at 270. Daytrading, made possible by the prevalence of home and work
computers and relatively inexpensive Internet-broker trading fees, allowed individual
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expanded coverage of the financial markets fed individual
investors' insatiable appetites for stock ownership and
participation in the IPO-dot.com craze.161 In this speculative
period, greed tainted almost everyone associated with the financial
markets. 169 During this time, accounting firms developed conflicts
of interest with the corporations whose financial books they were
charged with monitoring, as they added lucrative consulting
services in addition to the auditing functions performed for their
clients. 7 ° Investment banks, meanwhile, were grasping for the
enormously profitable initial public offering (IPO) business.' 7 '
Indeed, CS First Boston, the IPO leader, devised a fraudulent
scheme to reap even greater profits from these deals.'72 At the
investors to make numerous stock trades throughout the day. Id. Unfortunately, this
popular trend resulted in losses for nearly all daytraders. Id.
168. Id. at 286. For example, in December 1998, Henry Blodgett an unknown
thity-three-year-old analyst at a second-tier firm predicted that Amazon.com, which
was already trading at an outrageous $243 per share, would reach $400 within a year.
Id. at 276. The stock jumped to $289 by the end of the day and soared to $400 within
a month. Id. Blodgett gained an immediate following, signaling the opening of the
IPO floodgates. Id.
169. See id. at 207. In 1996, Greenspan delivered his famous, though ineffective,
"irrational exuberance" speech attacking the speculative bubble that had formed in
the U.S. stock market. Id.
170. Id. at 206.
171. Id. at 269-77. IPOs were the most lucrative transactions a Wall Street firm
could perform for a corporate client. Id. at 277. IPOs warranted higher fees because
they were risky and required that bankers meet extensive SEC filing requirements
describing a company's risk. Id. at 278. The standard fee for almost all IPOs was
seven percent, more than ten times the fees from most structured derivatives deals,
and substantially more than any other investment-banking service that could be
provided. Id. at 277. Wall Street firms were making tens of billions of dollars in the
late 1990's and paid almost half of their revenues to employees. Id. at 269.
172. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 278-80. CS First Boston concocted a kickback
scheme that allowed it to make money on the IPO and then on inflated commission
kickbacks. Id. CS First Boston arranged to sell IPO shares to certain established
customers at the IPO price. Id. In return for letting the customers in on the deal, in
which they reaped huge profits, the customers were required to sell positions from
their own accounts at very high commission rates as a payback for the IPO
opportunity. Id. CS First Boston's newly appointed CEO, Gary Lynch, quickly
negotiated a $100 million settlement and the Department of Justice dropped the
criminal charges. Id. at 284. Frank Quattrone, a CS First Boston banker, was the IPO
king. See id. at 268-69. During the 1990s, he was the highest paid person on Wall
Street and was making over $100 million a year after taking Cisco, Netscape,
Amazon.com and many other technology wonders public. Id. at 268. After being
indicted for obstruction of justice relating to the CS First Boston kickback scheme,
his recent trial resulted in a hung jury. See Brooke A. Masters & Carrie Johnson,
Banker's Case Ends in Mistrial, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2003, at A01.
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same time, securities analysts were reinventing themselves as their
compensation became tied to the investment banking business
they generated for their firms.173 With technology advances and
other market efficiencies threatening analysts' job security, they
became the mouthpieces for the corporate "pump and dump"
scandals that would come to mark the era.'7 4 Equally culpable in
the flourishing malfeasance were the corporate directors and audit
committee members who failed to ask the hard questions
necessary to properly police corporate accounting practices.17
The SEC responded to the IPO scandals with several wellintentioned, but ineffective, rules.'7 6 Importantly, in 2000, the SEC
implemented the Commodity Futures Modernization Act,
77
providing for the regulatory exemption of OTC derivatives.1
The deceptive practices of securities analysts and other
insiders during this period explained much of the "irrational
exuberance" that fueled the market to its peak in 2000.178 When
173. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 286. Before the 1990s, securities analysis had
been a respected profession, and investors relied upon and trusted the quality of
analysts' research and the independence of their opinion. Id. at 285.
174. Id. at 287. "Pump and dump" described the process where securities analysts
pumped up the price of a stock through "strong buy" recommendations so that
investors would flood in and maintain the stock price at a high level for the 180-day
lock-up period during which corporate insiders were prohibited from selling their
stock, after which the insiders would dump their shares on the market and the price
would plummet. Id. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer eventually issued
subpeonas for the e-mail records of securities analysts at several large Wall Street
banks, including Merrill Lynch, where Henry Blodgett worked, and CS First Boston.
Id. The documents provided the "smoking-gun" that Spritzer needed to prosecute
the players in the IPO kickback and fraud scandal that included the banks, the
corporate executives, and the analysts. Id. at 288. The e-mails revealed that analysts
publicly touted stocks and privately ridiculed them. Id. Records showed that
analysts referred to stocks they had rated "neutral" as "crap," "a dog," and "going a
lot lower." Id. Worse yet, stocks with "buy" ratings were described as a "piece of
shit," "such a piece of crap," "going to 5" (the lowest "sell" rating), a "piece of junk"
or "powder keg." Id. at 289.
175. Id. at 206-07.
176. Id. at 294. From 1998 to 2000, the SEC passed rules that 1) required
corporate financial statements to be written in plain English; 2) standardized revenue
recognition practices; 3) prohibited intentional misstatements of financial results and
required additional disclosures; and 4) prohibited companies from selectively
disclosing information to securities analysts. See id. at 294, 361.
177. Id. at 295. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 27 -27f
(2000), also known as the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 1A(5), Title IV (2000).
178. See supra note 169, at 207, 276-77.
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the bubble finally burst, empty-handed investors slowly sobered up
179
to the realization they had been duped.
V. ENRON

In March 2002, Enron sent the market tumbling as
revelations of corruption surfaced that would scale unimaginable
heights when the full story was told. 180 After Enron's implosion,
its many secrets were exposed.18
Among them, the startling
disclosure that Enron was not an energy company after all, but
182
rather an enormously profitable derivatives-trading firm.
Moreover, Enron collapsed not because it was insolvent, but
because institutional investors, banks, and credit rating agencies
abandoned the company when they learned it was a highly
leveraged derivatives empire employing extremely complex,
though arguably legal, partnership deals.'83
The Enron story began in 1985 when Kenneth Lay formed
the natural gas production company just as the groundwork for the
OTC-derivatives market was being laid. 84 In 1990, Lay hired
Jeffery Skilling 8 5 and Andrew Fastow,186 both of whom swiftly
transformed Enron from a stodgy energy company into an energy
trading giant. 187 During the early 1990s, Lay fostered important
banking relationships while Fastow kept a close eye on product
179. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 269. By 2002, ninety-nine percent of all
Internet-company IPOs traded below their first-day closing price and more than half
were worth less than $1 per share. Id.
180. See id. at 295.
181. Id. at 297.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 298. Enron resulted after the merger of one of the largest natural-gas
companies in the world, Omaha-based InterNorth and Lay's company, Houston
Natural Gas. Id.
185. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 209. Skilling had an M.B.A. from Harvard and
worked as an energy-trading consultant at the prestigious firm of McKinsey & Co.
when Lay hired him away. Id. Skilling's vision was to revolutionize Enron into an
energy-trading powerhouse based on intellectual capital instead of physical assets.
Id. at 300-01.
186. Id. at 301. Fastow was a recent Northwestern M.B.A. graduate with training
in structured finance. Id.
187. Id. These skilled new recruits, together with Lay's relationship building
talents, helped Enron become the seventh-largest company in the U.S. Id. at 296.
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developments at Bankers Trust, First Boston, and Salomon. 188 By
1993, Skilling had Enron actively trading energy derivatives.189
Fastow soon became a prolific designer of SPE
partnerships that allowed Enron to conduct structured finance
deals using non-recourse financing.1 9 More importantly, the SPE's
permitted Enron to keep the partnerships' debt off its balance
sheet, protecting Enron's credit rating and keeping its cost of
capital low.1 91 Fastow's special partnerships began as structures to

finance the company's oil and pipeline deals.' 92 However, the
partnership structures rapidly mutated into transactions of
inconceivable complexity, serving to manipulate Enron's earnings
193
while generating a personal fortune for Fastow.
In 1993, Fastow began devising the Joint Energy
Development Investments Limited Partnership (JEDI) deals that
would eventually lead to the company's ruin. 94 Enron's equal
partner in the first SPE involving JEDI was the California Public
Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). 95 Enron was
permitted to exclude JEDI's assets and liabilities from the
company's financial statements since it controlled only fifty
percent of the JEDI-CalPERS SPE, with CalPERS controlling the
other half. 196 Fastow quickly adapted the JEDI formula to other
uses. 197 In one transaction, Fastow arranged to have Chewco, a
phony outside investor, buy out CalPERS in order to create JEDIChewco, a new SPE.

98

To qualify as an SPE and avoid

consolidation of its debt on Enron's financial statements, Chewco,
188. Id. Enron had very close relationships with Citibank, J.P. Morgan, and Chase
Manhattan. Id.
189. Id. at 302.
190. Id. at 301. Non-recourse financing allowed Enron to borrow money for a
project based solely on the assets of the partnership and without recourse to Enron
for the partnership debts. Id.
191. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 301. The accounting requirements for offbalance reporting limited Enron's ownership of the partnership to fifty percent, thus
permitting merely footnote mention of the partnership activities. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 310, 313-14.
194. Id. at 302, 309.
195. Id. at 302.
196. Id.
197. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 309.
198. Id. at 310.
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as the outside investor, had to meet a minimum three percent
independent equity requirement.199 Fastow rustled up an Enron
employee willing to serve as the three percent equity owner, then

arranged a loan for the employee to satisfy the remaining debt
requirement. 20 0 Although Chewco was really not an independent
outside investor, Enron's advisors at Arthur Andersen determined
that the JEDI-Chewco partnership qualified as an SPE.2°1 Enron
continued to do deals through JEDI substituting one "outside"
investor after another, keeping the transactions off Enron's
2°2
financial statements, except for footnote entries.
In the 1990s, in the midst of Fastow's creative flourish,
Enron aggressively expanded outside the U.S. 20 3 It then loaded its
board and audit committee with members that reflected its new
international presence, thereby ensuring diminished oversight and
monitoring since many new directors were unfamiliar with U.S.
laws and accounting rules. 2z° As Enron's deals became more
arcane, Lay relinquished control of the company to Skilling and
Fastow. 2°5 In 1996, Lay promoted thirty-five-year-old Fastow to
senior vice president of finance after he raised over $5 billion for
Enron through structured financings.26 In 1997, Skilling was

199. Id. at 310-11. The Emerging Issues Task Force of the Financial Standards
Board issued EITF 90-15, which allowed companies to move leases off their books if
independent, outsider investors "bore at least three percent of the residual risk of the
lease." Id. at 310. This so-called "three percent rule" was applied by companies to
transactions other than leases. Id. In 1991, the SEC sanctioned the rule with some
caveats. Id.
200. Id. at 311. Enron put up cash collateral for the loan so that an employee,
Michael Kopper, actually had no risk, which should have disqualified Chewco as an
independent investor for the SPE. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 311-12.
203. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 303. To fund the expansion, Enron used its
own stock shares to pay for its overseas investments, an arguably legal practice,
rather than borrow money and hurt its credit rating. Id. at 303-04.
204. Id. at 304-05. In 1993, Lay appointed Wendy Grammn as a director and
member of the audit committee just weeks after she left her post as Pres. George
H.W. Bush's former Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) chair. Id. at
147, 302. Just prior to her departure she conveniently passed regulatory reporting
exemptions for OTC derivatives. Id. at 302.
205. Id.
Lay concentrated his efforts on building business and political
connections. Id. Not only did Lay chair the 1992 Republican National Convention in
Houston, he even sat with George H.W. Bush in the presidential box. Id.
206. Id. at 305.
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appointed president and COO. 217 Skilling immediately set out to
make Enron one of the most recognizable names in the world.0 8
In 1999, after receiving an award for "unique financing
techniques," Fastow employed his JEDI strategies to mask his
most nefarious transactions yet.20 9
At about this time,
EnronCapital, the company's venture-capital subsidiary, made a
$300 million gain after funding the IPO for Rhythm
NetConnections, a start-up technology company.210 In order to
hide the gain and present an image of a steady, growth-oriented
company, Fastow devised a scheme whereby Enron ran the IPO
profits through an SPE partnership so the gain was not reported
on Enron's books.21 To accomplish the feat, Fastow set up a
highly complex partnership called LJM (and later LJM2).2 2
Fastow himself served as the independent, outside investor of LJM
in clear violation of regulatory rules21 3 and Enron's Code of
Conduct.2" 4 Without explaining the esoteric financial gymnastics
207. Id. Lay's attention turned to fostering his social and political ties, which
included lobbying his friend, then Texas governor George W. Bush. Id.
208. Id. at 306. Since Internet technology companies were in vogue at the time,
Skilling set out to recast the behemoth Enron as a hip dot.com-like company. Id.
Enron issued 16 million stock options to its employees and executives in 1998. Id.
From 1999 to 2000, Enron more than doubled the number of options to roughly five
percent of Enron's outstanding shares. Id. To reduce its risk, Enron devised intricate
forward purchase arrangements that ensured it would have adequate shares to cover
the options without requiring any cash. Id. at 306-07. These repurchase arrangements
involved OTC-derivatives so they, too, were off-balance sheet transactions. Id.
209. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 312 n. 28 (quoting Lauren Steffy, Enron ExCFO Fastow Set Up Partnerships That Led to Failure,BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 19,
2001).
210. Id. at 308-09.
211. Id. at 312; see also Steven L. Schwartz, Enron and the Use of and Abuse of
Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1310-11
(2002) (examining the structure of Enron's SPEs in contrast to other users of
structured finance transactions) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
212. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 312-13. The partnership LJM's initials stood for
the names of Fastow's wife and two daughters and served to purchase put options for
Enron's Rhythm NetConnections shares while they were in the lock-up period. Id. at
312-14. LJM2 functioned as a trading partner to Enron, enabling it to sell its dark
fiber optics cable for a gain even though there was really no market for it. Id. at 31619.
213. Id. at 312-13.
214. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 211, at 1312, n.19-20 (noting that Enron's Code of
Conduct provided, in essence, that no officer or employee should own a direct or
indirect interest in an entity that does business with the Company, unless such
interest is previously disclosed in writing to the Chairman and CEO for approval).
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involved, Fastow persuaded Enron's hands-off board that the
partnerships provided valuable trading partners for Enron.2" 5 The
deceptive partnership transactions were essentially Enron making
a market and trading with itself while avoiding disclosure to
shareholders, other than through cryptic footnotes.216 Like a mad
scientist, Fastow went on to create "diabolical[ly] intricate"
partnerships called "Raptors," using virtually incomprehensible
derivatives constructions.2 7 In the end, Fastow's shrewdness
minted him a $45 million personal fortune," 8 as well as a federal
indictment.2 9
During this time, Enron generated enormous profits from
its natural gas and electricity derivatives trading business by
exchanging billions of dollars of long-term natural gas and
electricity derivatives based on commitments to buy or sell energy
products of various types for ten years or more. 220 Nevertheless,
investors only seemed interested in hot Internet technology
companies, not speculative trading firms, and as a result, Enron's
stock price suffered.221 In response, Skilling aggressively set up
new technology businesses to appeal to market demand while
working Enron's books so that it appeared the company was
215. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 312-13. Even though Fastow's participation the
LJM and LJM2 were obvious conflicts of interest, Enron's directors allowed them
without the disclosures required by securities laws. Id.
216. Id. at 314.
217. Id. at 315. Raptor partnerships functioned to inflate the value of Enron's own
assets by selling a portion of the assets to a Raptor at an artificially high price then
revaluating the remaining major share of the assets Enron still held at the artificially
high price. Id. at 316. For a detailed explanation of the mechanics of the Raptors
partnerships, see William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 961, 973-83
(2003).
218. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 313.

219. Rebecca Smith, Fastow, FormerEnron Officer, Indicted by U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 2002, at A2. Fastow was indicted on 78 counts of federal fraud, conspiracy,
and money laundering. Id. John R. Emshwiller & Thaddeus Herrick, Fastow Plea
Deal May Boost Cases Against Enron's Ex-CEOs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 04, at A3.
Fastow plead guilty to two criminal counts, and agreed to a 10-year sentence,
forfeiture of $23 million, and cooperation in an ongoing investigation into charges
against other former Enron executives. His wife, Lea, also an Enron executive, plead
guilty to one criminal tax count, and received a minimum 5-month prison term. Id.
220. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 307. Because long-term energy contracts were
not traded on organized exchanges, Enron traders profited by exploiting market
mispricings as well as less savvy participants. Id.
221. Id. at 307-08.
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making money from the technology businesses and not its
In 2000, Enron reported more than
derivatives trading business.
$1 billion in revenues, a fraction of the real income generated from
its derivatives trading business,223 which included trading of natural
gas, electric power, plastics, metals bandwidth, pollution, and
weather commodities.224 Profitable to the end, derivatives trading
revenues totaled $3.8 billion in 2001, Enron's final year of
trading.225
Enron traders made so much money from derivatives
trades they were forced to develop strategies to hide their profits
and save them as future reserves, since traders making "smooth,
Enron's
consistent profits received bigger bonuses. 226
222. Id. at 319-23. The technology businesses included EnronOnline and Enron
Energy Services (EES) that, while money losers, gave Enron the appearance of a
respectable company that generated consistent revenues. Id. at 323. EnronOnline
functioned as an OTC exchange for trading various commodities and derivatives. Id.
at 319. "Enron booked EnronOnline's trades as revenue, even though money paid by
buyers went directly to sellers." Id. It was these false revenues that elevated Enron
to seven on the Fortune 500 list of top U.S. companies, based on revenue. Id.
EnronOnline did make legitimate profits from selling weather derivatives, which
were essentially bets on changes in the weather over a period of time that especially
appealed to farming, leisure, insurance, and travel businesses. Id. at 321. EES
solicited energy conservation contracts with individuals and corporations seeking to
improve energy efficiency and cut costs. Id. at 322. Despite its inability to make
money due to poor controls and contract over and under valuations, EES's investors
and securities analysts loved it. Id. at 322. The problem with the approach was that
the needs of Enron's technology companies directly conflicted with the needs of its
trading business. Id. at 308. As a technology company, Enron needed to borrow
billions of dollars to finance infrastructure and R&D. Id. As a trading company, it
needed to keep its debt low to maintain a high credit rating which assured continued
access to investment capital. Id.
223. Id. at 323. "Enron was also advising other companies on how to create
phantom revenue and earnings" during this time. Id. at 358-59. In 1999-2000, Enron
entered into long-term fiber optic swaps with Global Crossing (GC), a global
telecommunications network company, in order to help GC manufacture income to
meet its quarterly earnings expectations and hide its mounting debts. Id. at 359-60.
Enron's collapse cast suspicions on GC, and the company spiraled into bankruptcy
just two months after Enron. Id. at 365. Unlike Enron and GC, WorldCom, formerly
the world's second largest provider of long-distance telephone services, was not
involved in derivatives schemes, as many in the industry believed. Id. at 367-70.
Instead, its demise was due to basic accounting fraud. Id.
224. Id. at 347.
225. Id. at 323.
226. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 325. Traders who reported smooth, consistent
profits "were perceived as making more money per unit of risk," according to
corporate formulas. Id. Consequently, traders resorted to two strategies to hide
trading profits. Id. at 325. Prudency reserves involved complex manipulations that
essentially misstated the volatility of the derivatives traded,changing the valuation of
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accountants at Arthur Andersen never caught on to these profit
manipulation practices, which continued for years."' Indeed, the
traders' derivative revenue mismarkings, estimated at more than
one billion dollars,228 continued to generate income throughout
Enron's bankruptcy, long after the traders were gone.22 9
Remarkably, the accounting schemes that triggered Enron's
downfall were not really attempts to hide losses, but rather were
strategies to conceal its immense energy derivatives bounty while
maximizing trader compensation.23 °
The swift decline of Enron began in October 2001 when
several securities analysts discovered Fastow's personal "related
parties" disclosures in the company's annual report footnotes.231
When they demanded Fastow's removal from the partnerships,
Enron promptly complied and took a one-time $35 million charge
relating to the partnerships.232 The analysts' exposure triggered an
SEC inquiry and the dominos began to fall.233 The analysts,
furious that they had been misled, pursued the legitimacy of the
partnership dealings. 234 Lay quickly fired Fastow, fearing not that
the analysts would downgrade the company's stock rating, but that
the credit rating agencies would downgrade Enron's credit rating
and cut-off its access to capital.235
A credit rating downgrade would have destroyed Enron by
triggering an immediate call on nearly $4 billion in loans.236
the trading position. Id. at 325-26. Forward curves involved mismarking trade dates
into the future. Id. at 326. Additionally, derivatives traders felt compelled to conceal
profits made during the California energy crises to avoid the scorn of members of the
energy industry. Id. at 329, 323.
227. Id. at 328.
228. Id. at 327.
229. Id. at 330.
230. Id. at 327-30.
231. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 331. Global Crossing entered into so many
"related parties" transactions "it made Enron look like a nunnery." Id. at 356-57.
232. Id. at 331.
233. Id. at 332.
234. Id. at 333. Now that Eliot Spitzer was prosecuting securities analysts for
conflict of interest violations, they wanted to be sure they had accurate information
on the companies they were covering. Id.
235. Id. at 334, 336.
236. Id. at 336. Lay sent out a call to all of his political cronies, including Paul
O'Neill, Don Evans, Alan Greenspan, and various Bush administrative officials, but
none would agree to help. Id. at 335-36.
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Incredibly, despite an income restatement reflecting $600 million
of overstatements, resulting from the JEDI, Chewco, and LJM
partnership schemes that had been used to hide certain losses over
a four-year period, the credit rating agencies did not react. 237 The
brief reprieve ended when the credit agencies learned that Enron
had disguised $8 billion of "loans" as cash flow from operations,
leaving them no choice but to downgrade Enron's credit rating.238
The downgrade locked Enron's traders out of the capital markets,
making it impossible for them to sustain trading operations.239
With its core business destroyed, Enron filed for bankruptcy in
early December 2001, 240 and Ken Lay stepped down in January
2002.241
Meanwhile, partners242 at Arthur Andersen who had
consulted on and approved the suspicious SPE partnerships
"powered-up the firm's shredders., 243 Andersen had failed to
properly audit Enron's books and allowed the substantial
consulting fees it was earning to cloud its judgment in monitoring
the company's accounting practices.2 Ultimately, Andersen was
convicted of obstruction of justice for destroying Enron-related
documents and was itself forced to dissolve.2 45 Enron's collapse
237. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 337. After the revision, Enron's net income
was substantial and its debt manageable, reflecting a profitable company. Id. In fact,
after the restatement, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase loaned Enron $1 billion in
secured loans. Id. at 336.
238. Id. at 338-39. Enron's bankruptcy examiner would eventually find another
$25 billion of debt. Id. at 339.
239. Id. at 341.
240. Id. at 343. Before it declared bankruptcy, Enron paid out $55 million in
advance bonuses to its top energy derivatives traders so they would stay on long
enough for Enron to sell off its trading business. Id. at 342-43. This was arguably in
violation of bankruptcy law. Id. at 343. Amazingly, J.P. Morgan Chase and
Citigroup loaned Enron an additional $1.5 billion to sustain its dwindling operation.
Id. Enron wound up essentially giving its trading operations away to Union Bank of
Switzerland, who agreed to receive Enron's assets but not its liabilities. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 335. Following his swift firing, David Duncan, the lead Andersen
partner for Enron left with six boxes full of Enron records that had escaped the
shredders and would later prove instrumental in the criminal investigation of Enron.
Id.
243. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 335.
244. Id. at 334, 336. Enron was Andersen's most important Houston client,
generating $52 million in fees in 2000, mostly for consulting advice. Id. at 334.
245. Id. at 347.
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cast a bright light on the widespread use of off-balance sheet
activities and deceitful practices at the world's leading
corporations, including most notably WorldCom and Global
Crossing.246
In addition to the direct participants responsible for
Enron's collapse, those equally culpable included credit-rating
agencies that failed to perform their due diligence in assessing
Enron's leverage and risk, investors who had not scrutinized
Enron's financial statements and footnotes, and legislators and
regulators who enacted and implemented the rules that permitted
Enron for years to engage in its manipulative, "reprehensible
' Enron's demise was the culmination of the corporate
practices."247
cultural ills that had developed in the financial markets over the
preceding decade.248 The complex and obscure nature of Enron's
derivatives deals and financial statements frustrated the ability of
the appropriate gatekeepers, including its accountants, board of
directors and the credit-rating agencies, to perform their functions
properly.249 Furthermore, the deregulatory climate made it such
that no corporate executive, banker, or accountant realistically
feared any "substantial punishment for misleading investors."25
VI. LESSSONs LEARNED

In 2000, corporate defaults reached a record $42 billion,
with the number tripling in 2001.251 Yet, U.S. commercial banks

seemed unscathed by the carnage, thanks in large part to credit
derivatives.252 Credit derivatives are essentially "bets on the
creditworthiness of a particular [borrower]" that enable banks to

246. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
247. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 347.
248. Id.
249. Id. See generally Examiner's Report (3 "dInterim) of Neal Batson, CourtAppointed Examiner (In Re: Enron Corp.) (July 28, 2003) available at
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enron/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004)
(describing details of Enron's inner workings revealed through its ongoing
bankruptcy examination).
250. See Partnoy, supra note 2, at 347.
251. Id. at 373.
252. Id. at 374.
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sell-off risky debt, thereby hedging their loan portfolios. 3
Additionally, credit derivatives permit banks to eliminate loans
from their balance sheets, thus freeing up capital reserves they
would otherwise be required to maintain. 4
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and credit default
swaps are two basic types of credit derivatives. 5 In a typical CDO,
a banking institution sells loans or bonds 256 to an SPE where the
debt is then split into pieces and new securities linked to each
piece are sold. 7 Credit rating agencies rate the various pieces and
all but "the lowest quality pieces" receive investment grade
21
ratings.8
In 2002, over one half trillion dollars in CDO's
9
existed.
Credit default swaps are essentially a bet between two
parties that a certain borrower will default. 26" The party betting
the borrower will default "buy[s] protection;" whereas the party
betting the borrower will pay "sell[s] protection., 26
If the
borrower misses a loan payment, the seller of protection must pay
the buyer a preset amount.262 Commercial banks buy credit
protection by paying a fee to investors in "exchange for the right
to receive payment[s] if a particular company default[s] on its
debts., 263 By 2002, banks had hedged hundreds of billions of
dollars of loans throughout the world using credit default swaps,
253. See id.
254. Id. at 384. Banks used this new available capital in their securities trading
activities, which had become far more lucrative for banks then the traditional
business of lending. Id.
255. Id. at 374.
256. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 383-89. The typical CDO is comprised of at
most 100 companies. Id. at 389.
257. Id. at 383. CDO's perform similarly to the CMO's developed by Salomon and
the CBO's created by CSFP in the mid 1990s. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
258. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 383.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 374.
261. Id. at 375.
262. Id.
263. Id. Citigroup's credit risk strategy involved the creation of SPEs through
which it issued a special type of credit derivative that allowed investors to keep
AAA-rated bonds if the borrower repaid its loan, but in the event of non-payment
the AAA-bonds would be replaced by the bonds issued by the defaulting borrowing,
which would in all likelihood be essentially worthless. Id. at 376.
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which meant that any resulting losses were borne by worldwide
investors. 264 Banks and bank regulators hailed the utility of credit
derivatives in keeping banks afloat and reasonably safe despite the
simultaneous and massive loan defaults by Enron, Global
Crossing, WorldCom and others.265
However, critics warned that banks were passing on loan
risks to less sophisticated investors that the banks were in a much
better position to evaluate and monitor.266 Others argued that
credit derivatives "distorted global investment by leading parties
to misprice credit risk" and stressed that higher costs associated
with these investments would depress corporate expansion
projects and cause economic growth to suffer.2 67 However, even
with these shortcomings, it is clear today that credit derivatives
helped immunize banks from ruin in the wake of Enron and other
bankruptcies. 268 Equally true, however, is that any potentially
destabilizing effects that credit derivatives may have on the world's
financial markets remain unexamined.269
Infectious Greed concludes by reviewing the market
destabilizing aspects of OTC derivatives.270 Partnoy returns to his
concerns about the susceptibility of OTC derivatives to abuse by
264. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 375-76. The biggest sellers of credit default
swaps were U.S., European and Japanese insurance companies and pension funds
that were able to use the unregulated instruments to leverage their portfolios and
avoid legal rules that limited their investments from taking on too much risk. Id. at
377. Estimates indicated that insurance companies had exposure to over $10 billion of
WorldCom debt. Id.
265. Id., at 375-76. Commercial banks extended an estimated $10 billion dollars of
credit default swaps on WorldCom loans alone. Id. at 375. After entering into 800
credit default swaps involving $8 billion dollars of Enron, J.P. Morgan Chase lost
"only" $456 million dollars on those loans. Id. at 376.
266. Id. at 381-82.
267. Id. Another troubling aspect of credit derivatives system was its dependence
on the increasingly powerful credit rating agencies who rated the debt pieces which
thereby made the pieces of loan more valuable than the original loans. See id. at 38485. What concerned observers was that credit rating agencies relied on the banks'
computer models to assess the values of CDOs, so naturally the debt pieces were
overrated. Id.at 386.
268. See id. at 374.
269. Id. at 389. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley legislation required securities regulators
to study how credit-rating agencies fit within the framework of financial regulation.
See id. at 389, 393. To date, no substantial rules or changes in practice for credit
rating agencies have been made. Id.
270. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 393-96.
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rogue traders as the result of managements' loss of control and
push for short-term profitability.2 ' He stresses the importance of
regulatory reform of OTC derivatives to correct the current
regulatory environment allowing off-balance sheet reporting of
such instruments, which serves as an incentive for managers to
engage in financial deception to avoid legal rules.272
Derivative proponents argue that derivatives are "vital,"
"indispensable,, 27 3 "effic[ient]," even "elegan[t]," architectures
that allow managers to isolate risks and transfer them to other
contracting parties. 274 Other noted non-speculative uses for OTC
derivatives include helping investors "gain information, hedge,
change their financial positions without trading, raise or invest
cash, change yields, calm corporate customers, profit from relative
mispricing, diversify, customize payoffs, and insure against
disasters.,275 Regardless of the differing views on the utility of
derivatives in the financial markets, like them or not, the more
than $100 trillion derivatives market 276 is likely here to stay.
With acceptance of that reality, Partnoy proffers several
recommendations for regulatory change. 277 First, he proposes that
derivatives be treated like "equivalent financial instruments,"
thereby requiring disclosure on corporate and institutional balance
sheets. 78 Additionally, he suggests that a shift from rules to
standards would eliminate the bright lines that technically
compliant accountants, lawyers and corporate executives have
proved so adept at sidestepping and exploiting.2 9 He further
argues for expanding the scope of securities fraud liability to
include aiding and abetting by all professional gatekeepers and the
elimination of the oligopoly of credit rating agencies by opening
271. Id. at 394.
272. See id.
273. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 2, 14.
274. See Feder, supra note 17, at 678, 682.
275. Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered
Derivatives,73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 491 (2000).
276. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 399.
277. Id. at 397-409.
278. See id. at 397.
279. Id. at 399. See generally William H. Widen, Enron At The Margin, 58 Bus.
LAW. 961 (2003) (arguing vigorously for changes in regulatory oversight from
compliance with technical rules to general standards).
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up the credit rating market to competition. 280 Finally, he points
out the merits of encouraging short selling by investors and
increased prosecutions in complex financial fraud cases.28'
VII. CONCLUSION

The years leading up to the devastation of Enron and the
effects it had on the world's financial markets were marked by a
As executive
period of furious financial innovation.282
compensation became intertwined with performance, corporate
leaders were desperate to find an edge to beat the competition and
Demand for
meet stock analysts' earnings expectations. 283
unregulated derivatives flourished as institutional investors and
corporate executives saw them as a means to reallocate specific
risks, increase profitability, and hide speculative positions from
shareholders. 284 Brilliant mathematicians and financial whizzes
responded by engineering derivative instruments of mind-boggling
complexity for hedging risk, speculation, and arbitrage. 285 The
complexity of these instruments along with deregulation presented
price valuation and monitoring problems that prevented both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors from accurately
evaluating the magnitude of risk exposure associated with these
holdings.286 Without proper controls and understanding of risk,
derivatives trading destroyed numerous powerful, prominent
institutions, most notably Enron.2 87 Enron's downfall exposed it as
a huge energy derivatives trading company that utilized complex
280. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 402. Partnoy further recommends that
regulators use some other standard in addition to credit ratings to determine
suitability of risks for certain investors. Id. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel
and Ebert of FinancialMarkets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999); Steven L. Schwartz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (both discussing
the role of credit rating agencies in the derivatives markets and arguing for their
reform).
281. See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 405-06.
282. See supra notes 43-124 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 53, 120, 123 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 90, 101-02, 127, 217 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 60, 79, 204, 244, 267 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 127, 140, 143, 223, 240 and accompanying text.
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lucrative
derivatives schemes to manipulate its earnings, hide its
2 88
fortunes.
insider
amass
and
business,
trading
derivatives
The banking industry's ability to avert financial crisis after
Enron, through the use of derivative instruments, revealed an
effective role for their continued use in the financial markets.289
Demand for derivative instruments is a signal to regulators and
market investors that these products serve desirable purposes for
end-users. 29" As risk reallocation tools,29 1 they enable market
players to reposition risk, thereby freeing up capital for other
uses. 29 2 The parties taking on the risks function as deconcentrating
forces within the market by spreading the risks among various
willing parties.293 Fears that risk valuation and pricing difficulties
associated with these novel, complex devices will destabilize U.S.
and global financial markets are realistic 294 but can be effectively
alleviated with improved pricing and monitoring systems. With
focused risk studies, increased education of market participants,
and regulatory improvements, OTC derivatives can offer the
financial markets and investors greater effectiveness and even
wider acceptance.
MONICA S. TEW

288. See supra notes 180-250 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 251-269 and accompanying text.

290. See Kraweic, supra note 16, at 8, 14.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See Feder, supra note 17, at 683.
See PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 384.
See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 15.
See id. at 3-4.
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